1		BEFORE THE
2	POLLUI	TION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON
3	IN THE MATTER OF	)
4	F.A.T. INC.,	) )
5	Appellant,	) PCHB No. 80-58
6	v.	) FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
7	PUGET SOUND AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITY,	) AND ORDER
8	Respondent.	)
9		)

This matter, the appeal of a \$250 civil penalty for the alleged violation of sections 8.02(3), 8.02(4) and 8.02(5) of respondent's Regulation I, came before the Pollution Control Hearings Board, Nat Washington, Chairman, and David Akana (presiding), at a formal hearing in Lacey, Washington, on July 24, 1980.

Respondent was represented by its attorney, Keith D. McGoffin; appellant was represented by Wray Featherstone, Jr., its vice president. Olympia court reporter Betty Koharski recorded the proceeding.

Having heard the testimony, having examined the exhibits and having considered the contentions of the parties, the Board makes these FINDINGS OF FACT

Ι

F.A.T. Inc., (hereafter FAT) is a corporation formed by three persons. In 1978, the corporation purchased a number of parcels of property located at or near 5604 South Third Street in the City of Everett, Washington. At the time of the purchase, a dwelling and out building were located on the site.

ΙI

On or about October of 1979, FAT embarked on a plan to build duplexes on the site and entered into a joint venture agreement with another corporation to develop the site. The understanding reached was that the other corporation would demolish the existing buildings and clear the land. Such other corporation would receive the necessary permits and one of the owners of FAT would haul the trash away. FAT did not intend to burn the demolished materials.

III

The structures on the site were demolished and placed in a pile.

The first attempt to haul the trash away was aborted because of the wet ground condition.

IV

On February 5, 1980, at about 4 a.m. the Everett Fire Department (EFD) responded to a fire upon appellant's site. The EFD believed that it extinguished the fire and left the site. The fire rekindled and the EFD returned to spread the burning pile and extinguish it at

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about 6:35 a.m. Because the fire was burning well in the rainy weather and many gallons of water were used on the fire, the EFD witness believed the fire to have been deliberately started. Upon being told of the fire, one of appellant's owners said that he thought the demolition pile had been removed.

V

Respondent's inspector, after learning of the fire, visited the site. He saw a 7 foot high, 25 foot diameter pile of demolition materials which included linoleum, tar paper and roofing material. The inspector determined FAT to be the owners of the property in question.

For the foregoing events, appellant was sent a notice of violation of sections 8.02(3), 8.02(4) and 8.02(5) of respondent's Regulation I. Following the assessment of a \$250 civil penalty, appellant appealed contending that it did not cause or allow the fire in question.

VΙ

Pursuant to RCW 43.21B.260, respondent has filed with this Board a certified copy of its Regulation I and amendments thereto which are noticed.

Section 8.02(3) makes it unlawful for any person to cause or allow any outdoor fire containing, among other things, asphalt, petroleum products, paints, and rubber products.

Section 8.02(4) makes it unlawful for any person to cause or allow any outdoor fire for the purpose of demolition of materials.

Section 8.04(b) provides that it shall be prima facie evidence

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that the person who owns or controls property on which an outdoor fire occurs has caused or allowed the fire.

Section 8.02(5) makes it unlawful for any person to cause or allow an outdoor fire in violation of any law of a governmental agency having jurisdiction over such fire. Ordinance 223-73 of the City of Everett, as amended by ordinance 423-76, makes it unlawful for any person to cause or allow an outdoor fire within the city with certain exemptions not here applicable.

Section 3.29 provides for a civil penalty of up to \$250 per day for each violation of Regulation I.

VII

Any Conclusion of Law which should be deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From these Findings the Board comes to these

## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Ι

There is insufficient evidence which would show that appellant or its agents did or did not actually start the fire. Accordingly, the presumption of Section 8.04(b), which provides that the owner of the property in question is deemed to have caused or allowed the fire, controls.

II

Appellant is deemed to have violated sections 8.02(3), 8.02(4) and 8.02(5) as alleged.

III

Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency v. Kaiser Aluminum and

Chemical Corporation, 25 Wn. App 273 (1980) requires that knowledge be shown as an element of a prima facie civil penalty case, at least until legislation reversing the holding becomes effective. knowledge element, a requirement here, is not expressly provided in section 8.04(b) but can be demonstrated by the agency.

However, knowledge of the facts, circumstances or results of this fire, or information which would lead a reasonable man to believe that such facts exists, was not persuasive in this instance. Accordingly, the imposition of a \$250 civil penalty is vacated.

IV

Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

From these Conclusions the Board enters this

ORDER

The \$250 civil penalty is vacated.

DONE at Lacey, Washington, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of August, 1980.

POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD

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